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THE TWELFTH ANNUAL HONORABLE
HELEN WILSON NIES MEMORIAL
LECTURE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW*
THE COPYRIGHT REVISION ACT OF 2026
– JESSICA LITMAN**
As someone who teaches and writes about copyright law, I end up
straddling two different worlds. On the one hand, I really do need to
understand and be able to teach the details of the copyright statute and
the case law construing it. My students need to know the difference
between a public performance right under Section 106(4) and a public
performance right by digital audio transmission under Section 106(6);
they need to know the difference between the statutory licenses
available under Section 114 and the statutory licenses available under
1
Section 115. So, I need to have all of those details pretty well nailed
down. At the same time, as an academic who writes normative and
historical articles and books about copyright, and who tries to explain to
her students why the statute works, or fails to work, the way it does, I
need to be pretty well grounded in copyright theory and in the
normative premises that are supposed to underlie the law.
The disconnect between those two realms is serious, and growing.
And, as a result, practicing copyright lawyers are finding much copyright
* Audio of the Twelfth Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in
Intellectual Property Law, held by Marquette University Law School (February 23, 2009) is
available at http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pageID=919.
This lecture is
delivered each spring semester by a nationally recognized scholar in the field of intellectual
property law.
** John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of
Michigan. Conversations with Jon Baumgarten, Abraham Drassinower, Dan Gifford, Kurt
Hunt, Pam Samuelson, and Seana Shiffrin have been important to my thinking on the project
that this speech is part of. In addition, for 25 years Jon Weinberg has read everything that
comes out of my printer before anyone else is allowed to see it. Like all of my work, the
speech is far better for his kibitzing.
1. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 106(6), 114, 115 (2006).
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scholarship less useful than they used to, and many copyright scholars
are finding members of the copyright bar less thoughtful than they used
to. This is a field in which conferences for CLE credit are common, and
the conferences commonly include both speakers who are law
professors and speakers who are practicing copyright lawyers, so one
gets to actually see folks snipe at each other. When I read or listen to
what august members of the copyright bar have to say about the work of
copyright law professors, I read or hear grotesque caricatures of ideas
no actual law professor I’ve ever met has read or said. I assume that
many copyright lawyers feel something similar.
That’s a pity, because I believe that we’re about to embark on the
beginning phases of another round of wholesale copyright revision.
That’s exactly the sort of situation in which the groups might have a fair
amount to offer one another.
Why do I think that we are now in the initial stages of an effort to
overhaul the copyright statute? There are moves that copyright lawyers
make when the law isn’t working well for them.
They avoid
inconvenient statutory language by persuading courts that the words of
the statute mean one thing in one context and a different thing in
another context. Under the 1909 Act, for example, the courts
developed alternate definitions of the term “publication” for different
2
purposes. Copyright lawyers sit down with other copyright lawyers and
negotiate a series of band-aid solutions in which they agree to behave
with one another as if the statute on the books said what they wished it
said. Under the 1909 Act, for example, music publishers and record
labels devised “Harry Fox” licenses to track the compulsory mechanical
license where they liked it and to vary its terms where they found the
3
statute inconvenient. Although copyrights under the 1909 Act were
formally indivisible, publishers devised a series of customary practices to
allow them to behave as if different copyright rights could be separately
4
owned.
In the ramp-up to actual copyright revision, copyright lawyers will
meet in small groups to see if they can generate agreement on what the
2. See William S. Strauss, Study No. 29: Protection of Unpublished Works 8-15, in 1
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 187, 198-205 (1963).
3. See Harry G. Henn, Study No. 5: The Compulsory Licensing Provisions of the U.S.
Copyright Law 44-52, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 877, 922-30 (1963); William M. Blaisdell,
Study No. 6: The Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License 93-104, in 2 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 937, 941-52 (1963).
4. See Abraham L. Kaminstein, Study No. 11: Divisibility of Copyrights 18-25, in 1
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 623, 642-49 (1963).
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law ought to look like. They will ask their pet legislators to float trial
balloons. They will use the tools that good lawyers have in their
toolboxes to try to position themselves to claim that whatever copyright
5
reform they seek is already well-established under current law.
We’ve been seeing a lot of that kind of thing recently. In the
multiple meanings department, we have fixation. Copyright lawyers
6
suggest that “fixed in tangible form” means one thing for the purposes
of investing copyright and a different thing in connection with
7
infringement. In the band-aid solutions department, we have notice
and takedown: Lots of industry actors have informally agreed with each
other to behave as if the notice and takedown provisions in Section 512
8
of the copyright statute applied to a more expansive group of activities
than the statute seems to contemplate. In the jockeying for position
department, we have a series of efforts to claim that the exclusive right
under 106(3) of the statute to “distribute copies to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending” covers a
very wide swathe of acts, some of which include no distribution, copies,
9
sale, transfer of ownership, rental, lease, or lending. What happens
next, if this era is like past ones, is a long, protracted process of
negotiation to come up with what will be called something like The
Copyright Revision Act of 2026 (to be fondly known as the ‘26 Act for
short).

5. For more detail on how these trends have manifested in the past, see JESSICA
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22-69, 89-100 (2006).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[A] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.”). The same section defines “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed,” and “phonorecords” as “material
objects in which sounds . . . are fixed by any method now known or later developed . . . .” Id.
7. Compare, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 104 Report:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Comm. of the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat121201.html (“we conclude that the making
of temporary copies of a work in RAM implicates the reproduction right so long as the
reproduction persists long enough to be perceived, copied, or communicated”), with, e.g., The
Family Movie Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat061704.html (“when software instructs a DVD player to
mute certain sounds or skip past certain images in a motion picture being played on the
DVD[, t]he putative derivative work is never fixed”).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
9. See, e.g., Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th
Cir. 1997); Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
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The reason for all of this maneuvering is that the current copyright
statute isn’t working the way anyone would like it to. We all want the
copyright system to nurture the creation, dissemination, and enjoyment
of works of authorship. That’s what copyright is for. When it works
well, it should encourage creators to make new works, assist
intermediaries in disseminating them widely, and support readers,
listeners, and viewers in enjoying them. If the copyright system poses
difficult entry barriers to creators, if it imposes complicated obstacles on
intermediaries, if it inflicts burdensome conditions and gratuitous
hurdles on readers, listeners, and viewers, then it is not going to work
very well. The current copyright law is flawed in all three respects.
Let’s start with authors: Encouraging authors to create is supposed
to be copyright’s central mechanism. In the real copyright system,
though, writers, artists, musicians, and filmmakers face daunting
obstacles in searching for opportunities to write, paint, play, or film
anything the public will see. Every year, the news coverage of the South
by Southwest music festival in Austin, Texas, marvels at all of the
musicians who converge on the conference, some of them subsidized by
governments in their home countries, in the hope of playing music that
10
someone will actually hear (despite the fact that listeners complain that
the music they hear on any given commercial radio station is the same
as the music they hear on any other commercial radio station).
Independent filmmakers finance their films on credit card debt and
family loans and submit them to multiple film festivals without ever
finding a distributor (despite the fact that this week the movie Friday the
th
13 is playing on six different screens where I live). Apprenticeships
and entry-level jobs in the recording, film, photography, or theater
business are so rare that they make tantalizing grand prizes for
television reality shows. There are about a zillion different how-to
books and a fair number of monthly magazines on how to get your book
published.
Even when creators succeed in publishing a book, cutting an album,
placing an article, or selling a screenplay, moreover, they typically earn
only a small share of the proceeds of the copyright in their work. A tiny
minority get rich from copyright royalties. A somewhat larger number
are able to make a living from creating works of authorship. The
10. See, e.g., Jon Pareles, Stoking Careers in Frenzy of South by Southwest, NY TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2009, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/arts/music/23sxsw.html;
James Reed, A Strong International Contingent plays well in Austin, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
23,
2009,
available
at
http://www.boston.com/ae/music/articles/2009/03/23/
a_strong_international_contingent_plays_well_in_austin/.
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majority of creators, though, need day jobs to supplement their income.
I’d guess that’s why some of you decided to go to law school.
Why is that? It’s not that nobody values works of authorship
enough to spend money for them. Studies of the size of the core
copyright industries in the U.S. economy indicate that they generate
11
nearly a trillion dollars. The reason is that very few of those dollars
end up in creators’ pockets. The copyright statute incorporates a bias in
favor of distributors. That bias comes at creators’ expense. People
argue that authors have very little bargaining power as compared with
publishers, but that isn’t inherent in the natural order. Rather, it
reflects the fact that the American copyright law does now and always
has tilted the playing field in distributors’ favor. The disparity of
bargaining power is at least largely an artifact of the way the copyright
law works.
Until recently, that tilt made a lot of practical sense. Our copyright
law was designed in an era in which mass distribution of copies of works
required a significant capital investment. We needed to shape the law in
ways that channeled the largest share of the proceeds from copyrighted
works to intermediary distributors so that they would buy the paper,
operate the printing presses, put up the broadcast towers, put together
the motion picture production companies, rent the warehouses, and
drive the trucks that moved copies of works of authorship from authors
to readers, listeners, and viewers.
Today there are lots of ways to disseminate works to everyone in the
world without having to spend much money. Indeed, that fact has
caused a copyright panic–individual readers, viewers, and listeners can
send copies to each other, for close to free, without having to get them
from a licensed source.
Many of the large legacy distributors have good reason to find the
current copyright climate uncomfortable. Reasonable people can
disagree about how the law should respond to that. My own view is that
if individuals can distribute copyrighted works less expensively than
conventional distributors, it makes no sense at all to try to prevent the
inexpensive, efficient distribution in order to protect the more
expensive, less efficient distribution. Rather, we should accept the fact
that the role of intermediaries in the copyright system needs to evolve,
st
and that, in the 21 century, it may no longer make sense to award the
11. See, e.g., STEPHEN E. SIWEK, ECONOMISTS INC., COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE
U.S.
ECONOMY:
THE
2006
REPORT
(2006),
available
at
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2006_siwek_full.pdf.
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intermediaries so large a share of the copyright bargain. Indeed, doing
so may generate perverse results.
Even for lean, mean, innovative distributors committed to digital
distribution, the current copyright system is a disaster. A distributor
seeking to exploit works in new media faces daunting difficulties in
identifying the rights-holders entitled to license its uses and negotiating
the terms of any licenses. Even established industry groups have
complained that the licensing provisions of the current law are simply
12
unworkable. Innovations like copyright divisibility, which seemed like
a good idea at the time, have vastly complicated the licensing of
copyrighted works by subjecting would-be licensees to multiple and
13
sometimes inconsistent demands. Small businesses who want to pay
reasonable royalties for the opportunity to exploit works in new markets
can face insuperable difficulties in arranging to do so. And, as new
entrants like MP3.com, ReplayTV, and iCrave TV learned the hard
way, trying and failing to cross the Ts and dot the Is, even with the
14
advice of counsel, is a great way to find yourself sued into bankruptcy.
There’s a second class of intermediaries who have been important in
the copyright system as a historical matter. These entrepreneurs have
not, historically, owned copyrights or licensed copyright uses. Rather,
they have invested in the copyright system by making instruments and
objects that allow people to enjoy copyrighted works. I call them
“makers.” They make pianos and trumpets and televisions and
computers and VCRs and iPods. The folks who make trumpets and the
folks who make iPods are in the business of making money, sometimes
lots of money, from music written by other people. Indeed, their entire
business model is the commercial exploitation of other people’s music.
But, because they don’t themselves engage in any of the actions that the
copyright law reserves to copyright owners, they haven’t had to worry
about the copyright law. Until recently.
These days, distributor entrepreneurs are looking at maker
entrepreneurs and demanding that they redesign their business models

12. See Reforming Section 115 of the Copyright Act for the Digital Age: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Comm. of the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007) (testimony of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat032207-1.html.
13. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 673 (2003).
14. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2004);
Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCRAVETV, 53 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1831 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
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to cut distributor entrepreneurs in. To put some teeth in what would
otherwise be a nice, but futile, request, they’re filing suit for
contributory infringement or “inducement” of infringement and then
offering to settle for a fat slice of revenue, a large dollop of digital rights
management, and a fair amount of control.
So, the current copyright law isn’t working well for creators. It isn’t
working well for distributors, and it’s getting scarier and scarier for
makers.
Well, how does it work for readers, listeners, and viewers?
Traditionally, copyright law was designed to encourage reading,
viewing, and listening by leaving readers (and viewers and listeners)
alone. The works protected by copyright were few, the rights conferred
by the copyright statute were narrow, and the boundaries outside them
left huge free spaces that allowed readers, listeners, and viewers to
enjoy copyrighted works as they wanted to without needing to worry
much about what the copyright law said. There weren’t many express
user rights in the statute, and they were (and are) a peculiarly motley
collection—basically Congress or the courts have stepped in to add
express user rights only when copyright owners overreached the
boundaries of these narrow exclusive rights. So, we have specific
provisions allowing people to play videogames in public places or to use
censorware in their homes to block the sexual or violent scenes in
15
movies released on DVDs. The provisions are exceptional, and most
16
of them trace their origin from ill-considered lawsuits.
Instead of setting out the scope of individual audience interests in
explicit terms, the basic architecture of the system respected the rights
of readers, listeners, and viewers by limiting the reach of copyright
rights.
That’s been changing, though. Part of what’s fueling the change is
that copyright owners are upset about unlicensed digital distribution
and want to make sure that readers and listeners don’t undermine the
markets of publishers and record labels by giving away for free what
copyright owners sell. That has inspired them both to identify
unlicensed consumer uses as “piracy” and to persuade Congress to enact
tough provisions making it illegal to circumvent copy protection.
15. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(e), 110(11).
16. See Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that playing a coin-operated video game in a video arcade constitutes a public
performance within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)); Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v.
Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (holding defendants liable for making and
distributing censored versions of copyrighted motion pictures).
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Consumers are experiencing copy-protection as a modest but significant
inconvenience that probably to some degree prevents reading, listening,
and viewing that would otherwise happen. So far, it doesn’t seem to
have made much of a dent in unlicensed uses.
Another part of the story has been the relentless pressure to expand
the scope of the individual bounded copyright rights so that they’re no
longer so bounded. Copyright owners need to do this in order to have
any real hope of holding makers liable for enabling new uses by
individual readers, listeners, and viewers. This expansion is, by and
large, non-statutory. Copyright owners have been advancing liberal
constructions of the individual copyright rights in courts, in treaty
negotiations, and in their copyright rhetoric. Under these constructions,
any unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is prima facie infringing.
The goal isn’t really to be able to bring copyright infringement suits
against millions of individuals, notwithstanding the 20,000 John Doe
suits brought by the record labels. Rather, copyright owners would like
to be able to recover infringement verdicts against the maker
intermediaries I mentioned earlier, who are facilitating unlicensed uses
of copyrighted works. Typically, as I said earlier, the maker isn’t itself
doing anything the copyright law prohibits, but it’s making money from
selling individuals something—like a VCR, a DVR, an MP3 player—
that allows them to make lots of individual unlicensed uses. Or, it’s
selling online advertising on sites where copyright infringement may be
going on. In order to argue that the maker is liable as a contributory or
vicarious infringer or an inducer, one needs to persuade a court that lots
of individuals out there are violating the law.
Finally, copyright owners have been pushing these expansive
constructions because they suspect things are going on that they can’t
prove, but they’d like to be able to get an injunction and damages for
things that they can prove—even if what they can prove isn’t really what
the statute says is illegal.
Consumers are caught in these pincers. There’s no evidence in any
of the legislative history of any of the copyright laws that Congress ever
intended to make most personal uses illegal. It didn’t matter a lot,
because, until recently, unlicensed uses by individuals in their homes
were hard to monitor and hard to prevent. Today, though, anything
that happens on a digital network can be monitored, and if it can be
monitored, there are at least some efforts to use technological tools to
either prevent it or to detect and avenge it. Many of those tools have
other uses that can constrain how individuals read, watch, or listen to
material or can facilitate massive surveillance. DVD players already

NIES 2009 FINAL FORMATTED REVISED 6-18-09

2009]

THE COPYRIGHT REVISION ACT OF 2026

6/19/2009 2:53 PM

257

prevent consumers from fast-forwarding through coming attractions or
watching a foreign DVD on a domestic DVD player. Copyright owners
are pushing the federal government to require television manufacturers
to equip all television receivers with tools that would allow monitoring
17
and control of TV viewing. Computers already come with technology
that allows some monitoring of computer uses; copyright owners are
pushing Internet service providers to engage in wholesale monitoring
18
and filtering of Internet use.
Comcast, for one, has already been
caught deploying some tools to mess with Internet connections to block
19
the use of software that has disproportionately infringing uses. Bottom
line for consumers: their historic copyright liberties to read, view, and
listen to works are shrinking fast, and a fair amount of reading, listening,
and viewing that would otherwise happen is discouraged by the hassle
factor.
So, we have a copyright statute that is currently failing its
constituents in multiple ways. We have signs that copyright lawyers are
gearing up for a statutory overhaul. If one were an optimist, this would
seem like a perfect opportunity to fix what’s broken.
I’m not an optimist.
I would like to be. I would like to think that we have a rare
opportunity for copyright scholars and copyright lawyers to sit down
with representatives of creators, distributors, readers, listeners, and
viewers and come up with a workable replacement for the current law.
It would be short—really short. In the best case, people affected by it
would be able to understand it without consulting a copyright lawyer. It
would correct the current tilt in the playing field toward distributors. By
this I mean both that it would give creators more meaningful rights
under the law and that it would reduce the current incentives for
intermediaries to artificially constrain the dissemination and enjoyment
of copyrighted works. It would preserve historic copyright liberties for
readers, listeners, and viewers. It would nonetheless reward investment
in creative endeavors with the opportunity to profit from the

17. See Broadcast and Audio Flag: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science
&
Transportation,
109th
Cong.
(2006),
available
at
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=
4237da77-4ae9-4e2d-b03d-215dcc725eae.
18. See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL
ST. J., Dec.
19, 2008, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122966038836021137.html.
19. See In re Free Press v. Comcast, FCC 08-183 (Aug. 2008),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_ public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf.
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commercial and public exploitation of copyrighted works. It would try
to provide easy licensing opportunities to make it simple for people who
want to pay to use copyrighted material to do so, but without
affirmatively encouraging investment in exclusionary, anti-competitive
tactics.
Let me stop and defend that list of goals. My first goal is that the
copyright law should be short and comprehensible to people without the
aid of a copyright lawyer. That may seem odd. After all, the state of
Michigan pays me to train copyright lawyers, so the more demand there
is for copyright lawyers, the more value there is in what I do. But that
doesn’t make a need for lots of copyright lawyers a good thing.
Consider bankruptcy lawyers. The current economic climate surely
means that demand for bankruptcy lawyers is skyrocketing, but that
doesn’t make it good news. Or, to switch professions, consider
physicians who study the transmission of terrible infectious disease. A
massive outbreak of a dire plague would undoubtedly make their
workdays more interesting, but if you asked them if they’d just as soon
the disease were contained before anyone could catch it, it’s pretty
obvious what they would say. I think a law that didn’t require creators,
distributors, makers, readers, listeners, and viewers to have copyright
lawyers at their elbow would be a big improvement over the one we
have now, which does. So, short is important to me.
Next on my list is to rebalance the ways the law deals the cards to
creators and distributors, to give creators a stronger hand and to give
distributors a weaker one. The pervasive favoring of distributors in the
current law is largely an artifact of their political clout. Still, when paper
was expensive, when mass dissemination required a printing press, a
broadcast tower, a CD stamping plant, it was an artifact that made a lot
of practical sense. Today, we need to realize that if we’re in the business
of bribing distributors to invest in mass dissemination, we are able to
bribe them with less because they can engage in mass dissemination
much more cheaply. Moreover, if individual consumers can distribute
copyrighted works to one another at minimal cost, we may not need to
bribe commercial distributors to do it at all. For some sorts of works—
scientific or legal research is one example—we may not need
commercial publishers.
Moreover, some of the worst excesses of copyright—the ones that
make it look illegitimate in the eyes of college students—are, arguably,
at least partly a result of the fact that distributors’ incentives to invest in
copyright are too large. These incentives motivate them to behave in
ways that are bad for the system. Once distributors have vested
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interests in the copyright system, though, they may take advantage of
opportunities to enhance their share of its benefits in ways that aren’t
healthy for the system as a whole. So long as distributors’ incentive to
invest in works of authorship encourages creation and enjoyment, it is a
useful part of the copyright ecosystem. Once the incentive to invest is
so large that it makes sense to try to suppress the creation, distribution,
or enjoyment of works one controls, or works that compete with those
one controls, the incentive has become counterproductive.
It seems to me that that’s what has happened over the past thirty or
so years. The copyright incentives for distributors to invest in acquiring
copyrights to works have simply grown way too large. Those incentives
apparently suffice to inspire distributors to divert resources to
artificially constraining outlets for copyrighted works to better enable
them to capture monopoly rents. By rebalancing the copyright bargain,
we can both reduce distributor incentives to undermine the health of the
system and also enhance the benefits we can afford to make available to
creators. Who wouldn’t want that?
My third goal is a copyright law that preserves historic copyright
liberties for readers, listeners, and viewers. I don’t know that this
requires a lot of defense. The reason we want to encourage authors to
create and distributors to disseminate works of authorship is so that
people will read the books, listen to the music, look at the art, watch the
movies, play the games, build and inhabit the architecture. That’s how
copyright law promotes the progress of science. Although some
copyright rhetoric seems to imply that so long as the law gives strong
incentives to create and distribute works, it doesn’t matter whether
anybody reads or listens to them, I don’t think anyone actually believes
that. In practical terms, that means we need to makes sure there’s
enough space, enough freedom, enough liberty built into the law to
ensure that the law doesn’t get in the way of reading, viewing, and
listening.
Those are general goals that should shape the way that copyright law
rewards creativity and investment in creative endeavors. I find it easy to
imagine a variety of different new copyright laws that would meet those
goals. Every few years, I ask all my copyright students to try to write
one, and they’ve come up with very useful and very different ways of
doing it.
When copyright lawyers and copyright scholars sit down at real
tables in real conference rooms and try to talk about reforming the
copyright law, though, everything is much more difficult. Copyright
scholars have, by and large, no constituency and no political clout, so
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folks are going to listen to us only if they feel we have something
worthwhile to say. Recently, as I’ve said, the view of much of the
copyright bar is that we don’t. Indeed, I’ll go further, and say that at
least some highly respected copyright lawyers have suggested that
copyright scholars advance dangerous and misleading views of the law
that, if taken seriously, could undermine the integrity of the entire
20
copyright system.
The copyright lawyers I’ve been talking with
represent clients, some of whom do have some political clout. Because
they have clients, of course, they’ve got good reasons to try to retain any
advantages they believe they get from the law on the books while
getting rid of the disadvantages. For some of them, the prospect of
copyright reform is a way to both cement their most heroic (by which I
mean least plausible) victories and reverse their unanticipated defeats.
Since we have lawyers on both sides of those cases, we can throw the
idea of a short law right out the window. The history of past revision
efforts is a protracted negotiation in which everyone ultimately agrees
to ratify the general concept of their historic victories while negating
their application to the specific facts that generated the lawsuits. Doing
that for lots of controversial cases can generate a very long, complicated
law that doesn’t seem to make a lot of policy sense.
That’s why I’m not optimistic. The trouble with the laws that come
out of a process like that is that in the long run, they aren’t good for
anyone. They undermine the public’s sense that copyright law is
legitimate and worth upholding.
So, I’d like to challenge you to a thought experiment. I assume that
my assertion about the purpose of copyright is uncontroversial. I’ll
repeat it: We want the copyright system to nurture the creation,
dissemination, and enjoyment of works of authorship. When it works
well, it should encourage creators to make new works, assist distributors
in disseminating them widely, and support readers, listeners, and
viewers in enjoying them. We may individually disagree on which of the
three interests should prevail in the event of a conflict. We may have
different ideas about how one gets there from here. We may differ
about, if there are extra statutory goodies to spread around, which
interest has the strongest entitlement to be given them. We would all,
though, agree that the current law leaves some things to be desired in
how it accomplishes these three goals.
20. See, e.g., Henry Horbaczewski, Copyright Under Siege: Some Thoughts of a
Publisher’s Counsel: The Sixth Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture, 54 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 387 (2006).
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Rather than looking at copyright reform as an avenue to nail some
things down and pry other things up, I suggest looking at it as an
opportunity to rethink the subject entirely. If this statutory revision is
like the last couple, it will consume a bunch of years. That’s going to be
a substantial chunk of your professional lives. Instead of nibbling
around the edges, let’s imagine that everything is up for grabs. It won’t
be, but thinking about it as if it is will help each of us to figure out what
is important to rethink and what we can get away with merely
remodeling.
If we were writing on a blank slate, how could we craft a law that
would meet those goals? Forget, for the moment, everything you know
about copyright law. Forget the six exclusive rights, the exclusions and
exemptions, the compulsory licenses, and the four fair use factors.
Could you write a statute that is better for authors, distributors, readers,
listeners, and viewers than the one we have now? Of course you could.
What would it look like?
The first objection I expect to hear to this thought experiment is that
we have treaty obligations that constrain us when we think about
redesigning the copyright law. They constrain us less, though, if we
don’t assume that the current barnacle-encrusted design of the law is a
21
22
given: It is okay under both the Berne Convention and TRIPS, for
example, for us to redesign the law so that we move power and control
away from distributors and towards authors. Imagine, for example, a
real termination right that allowed authors to terminate any transfer at
any time after 10 years had elapsed from the date of the grant. People
might raise all sorts of objections to that proposal on a lot of policy
grounds, but it would go a part of the way toward shifting the copyright
balance from distributors to creators and it would be fine under Berne
and TRIPS. Indeed, we can go much further than that: We could offer
authors meaningful attribution and integrity rights. That’s not only fine
under Berne and TRIPS, Berne requires it. We’re in breach of our
treaty obligations because we promised we would do that and failed to
follow up. Similarly, a host of private copying exclusions appear to be
Berne—and TRIPS—compliant. A variety of different reformulations
of the exclusive rights would pass muster under Berne and TRIPS.
21. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
last revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
22. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1197 (1994).
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This is to say that our treaty obligations leave us a fair amount of
23
room. More importantly, though, the kinds of incentives that made
th
th
st
sense in the 19 or even the 20 century may not make sense in the 21 .
If we figure out something that would work better than the current
model of copyright law, and we figure out why, then from there we can
try to sort out whether we can fit it within our treaty obligations or
whether it’s worthwhile to seek to vary the terms of the relevant
treaties.
Besides, it’s just a thought experiment. If everyone in the room
went home and wrote down a draft statute, none of those bills would
end up being enacted as The Copyright Revision Act of 2026. It seems
entirely possible, though, that if we all indulge in this thought
experiment or ones like it, the conversations we are doomed to have
about copyright reform over the next eighteen or so years will be more
civil, more interesting, and more useful.

23. Accord P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL
REPORT (2008), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/limitations_exceptions
_copyright.pdf.

